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An Evaluation of Universal Grammar
and the Phonological Mind1
Daniel L. Everett*
Department of Arts and Sciences, Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA
This paper argues against the hypothesis of a “phonological mind” advanced by Berent.
It establishes that there is no evidence that phonology is innate and that, in fact, the
simplest hypothesis seems to be that phonology is learned like other human abilities.
Moreover, the paper fleshes out the original claim of Philip Lieberman that Universal
Grammar predicts that not everyone should be able to learn every language, i.e., the
opposite of what UG is normally thought to predict. The paper also underscores the
problem that the absence of recursion in Pirahã represents for Universal Grammar
proposals.
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INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE
From Panini in India to Plato in Greece, scholars have for centuries studied human language to
reveal the essence of human nature (cf. Everett, accepted for recent arguments against the very
idea of “human nature”)2. Simplifying somewhat, the modern study of language has investigated
how languages diverge over time (diachronic linguistics). It examines the physical properties of
speech sounds, borrowing from physiology and physics to understand how sounds are made,
how they are transmitted across a medium, how they are heard, and what their articulatory and
physical properties are both in isolation and in context (phonetics). This scientiﬁc tradition has
also examined how larger spans of sounds are organized into a phonology (syllables, “feet,” and so
on). It also investigates word-formation (morphology), how sentences are put together (syntax),
how stories are structured (discourse theory), what meaning is and how it interacts with language
forms (semantics), and how language is shaped via the apex of human linguistic development –
conversations (pragmatics). And it asks about the universality of its ﬁndings.
From this rich history of linguistic studies, we have reached a divide: some researchers believe
that language structures emerge from universal principles of grammar. For the former, as early as
the late 17th century, culminating in the Port Royal grammar of 1660, linguists and philologists
began to postulate a universal base for human languages. Such researchers made the case that
all languages likely trace back to some original blueprint. Then in the latter half of the 20th
century, Noam Chomsky took on the challenge of understanding and investigating this blueprint,
by looking to biology as the source of grammar, proposing that all languages are simply local
manifestations of a biologically transmitted Universal Grammar.
Other researchers believe that grammar is in essence a local phenomenon. This is the alternative
I explore in what follows. In this view language and its components (grammar, phonetics,
1This paper is excerpted in large part from Everett (accepted) forthcoming. The section against the phonological mind, for
example, is almost verbatim from that larger work.
2Of course, the idea that there is no human nature is not original with me. See, e.g., Marx’s (1845/1976) “Thesen über
Feuerbach.”
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phonology, semantics, and so on) are perceived as local, cultural-
communicational outputs, with little or no evidence for a genetic
blueprint for grammar. I largely approach this issue negatively in
what follows, arguing against UG proposals, from the perspective
of Everett (2012a; see also Everett, accepted, in progress, among
others). I argue that there is no evidence for UG, not even from
the most articulated grammatical proposals in its favor to date,
Hauser et al. (2002) and Berent (2013a), along the way indirectly
supporting my own theory (see references) that language is a tool
shaped by culture (among other things) for communication. This
is by nomeans a novel position, though it is a path less followed. It
represents in fact the traditional position of the most inﬂuential
North American linguists of the early 20th century, Franz Boas
and Edward Sapir. Much of what follows draws heavily from
arguments and texts provided in Everett (accepted), updated
where appropriate.3
“MAN-IN-A-CAN” VIEW OF LANGUAGE
The modern idea of Universal Grammar (UG) emerged from
Chomsky’s work. The basic thesis of UG is that there is something
about the genetic component of human nature that guarantees
that there will be a core of “knowledge” common to all humans. If
so, then languages are essentially the same and only superﬁcially
diﬀerent.4
Yet an often overlooked, genetic criticism of UG, raised by
Lieberman (2013, 56ﬀ) is that UG predicts the opposite of what
it is claimed to predict. UG was proposed to account for a
hypothesized (never demonstrated) acquisitional homogeneity,
which children across cultures are said to achieve for their native
languages, as well as for the fact that all languages are built on the
same grammatical plan, a plan located somehow, somewhere in
the human genome (in a way that has never been speciﬁed in the
literature). As Lieberman points out, however, if language were
actually speciﬁed on the genes, it would be subject to mutations,
presenting a non-trivial problem for UG.
To take a concrete example, consider one commonly assumed
“parameter” of UG, the so-called “pro-drop” parameter –
intended to account for the ability of speakers of a language
to omit overt subjects from sentences. Thus in Portuguese, a
pro-drop language via a single gene (unlikely) or relationships
among multiple genes, one can utter “Está chovendo” while
in English the literal translation Is raining is ungrammatical.
Instead, English speakers must say “It is raining,” for the reason
that English apparently requires subjects and thus lacks “pro-
drop.”5 The question that arises is whether it is possible for
there to be a mutation that would prevent a particular person
from learning a pro-drop language. Such a mutation might
3There aremany other sources, however. Evans (2014) is another important source,
one of the very best, of arguments against Universal Grammar. But see also
Sampson (1999) and Tomasello (2005), among others.
4Often UG is confused in the popular media with “Deep Structure,” perhaps
owing in part to the work on the “Universal Base Hypothesis” of the Generative
Semanticists, the forefathers of functionalism. Though many linguists laugh at this
confusion, it is somewhat understandable.
5This is not entirely true, of course. One can say, while dying in a movie, for
example (in the indicative mood), “Must save Susan” or “Feel no hunger,” etc.
subsequently spread through a population via genetic drift or
some such, though that is not crucial. We need only to ﬁnd a
single individual that cannot learn English-like or Portuguese-
like languages, with no other cognitive deﬁcit – (simplifying) if
we assume that pro-drop is a genetically based parameter. This is
a valid question to put to any nativist theory. In fact, rather than
view this negatively, it can be seen positively – a strong prediction
by the theory of UG.6 It would strongly support UG to ﬁnd an
individual or a population whose only “cognitive quirk” were the
inability to learn pro-drop.7
A UG-proponent might rebut this argument, however, by
claiming that the “language instinct” is an organ and is no more
subject to mutation than arms, legs, livers, hearts, etc. But all are
subject to mutations. There are many genetic disorders of the
body and brain (e.g., sickle-cell anemia, dwarﬁsm, autism, and
so on). Such disorders are usually fatal or produce reductions
in oﬀspring and thus are not selected for. Sickle-cell anemia,
for example, shortens the lives of carriers relative to healthy
people (not good) but lengthens it relative to people stricken
with malaria (good). It spreads through a population in spite of
the unpleasant end it brings to its hosts, because it nonetheless
provides local advantages. In language a local advantage might be
to learn one’s parents’ language more quickly, even at the expense
of being able to learn other languages. There are indeedmutations
responsible for people being born with diﬀerent genes for body
shape, etc. In other words, and quite ironically, if grammar is
carried on the genes, then the strongest evidence for UG would
be the discovery that not all people may be able to learn every
language.8
There are claims for some mutations in language by
proponents of UG, but these are not the same. For example,
consider the following quote from Reboul (2012, p. 312):
“I would like to end this paper by discussing one of Everett’s
claims regarding the non-biological nature of language... if language
is biological, one would expect to ﬁnd “culture-gene mutations
aﬀecting speciﬁc languages of the world” (Everett, 2012a, p. 42)
and these do not exist. In fact, recent ﬁndings (see Dediu and
Ladd, 2007; Nettle, 2007) suggest that such mutations exist. Dediu
and Ladd established a strong correlation between (geographically
dispersed) tone-languages and allele frequencies for two genes
(ASPM and Microcephalin) in the populations speaking those
languages as compared with speakers of non-tonal languages. The
interpretation is that these speciﬁc alleles would facilitate the
learning of tonal languages through better acoustic discrimination.”
The idea that language (I-language, grammar, etc.) is carried
by the genes deﬁnitely predicts that it is subject to mutations.
This is not an argument – it is an entailment of nativist
6Note that speciﬁc theories which assume UG make many predictions, though
none that UG itself is causally implicated in so far as I can tell.
7But, in fact, there is not a shred of evidence for this. In fact, there is no evidence
at all for any language-speciﬁc cognitive deﬁcit (not even the Whorﬁan-labeled
“Speciﬁc Language Impairment,” Everett, in progress).
8Moreover, given what we know about “dual inheritance theory” and other
examples of quick genetic changes due to cultural pressures, e.g., lactose tolerance
in populations where milk is a part of the diet beyond infancy – a mutation that
spread within the past 6,000 years, well within the time frame of, say, pro-drop
(which goes back to Indo-European), there is nothing implausible about quick
changes.
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theory. And cultures, as Everett (2012a) points out, provide one
source of selectional pressure. What counts against nativism of
the Chomskyan variety is the clear failure of this prediction.
Moreover, the “counterexample” to my claim that Reboul
provides merely strengthens my case.
The claim that Reboul is supposed to be criticizing is the
idea that one population could, through selection of some
genetic features of language, be unable to learn the language
of another population. The ﬁndings of Dediu and Ladd, if true
(and I doubt it), far from falsifying my claim support it. This
is because they show that evolution can enhance perception
by human populations of the phonological/phonetic forms that
they commonly use. Their results apparently show that some
populations speaking tonal languages become better at perceiving
tones than others. But this contradicts my claim not at all, because
all languages use pitch. Therefore, this enhancement would
beneﬁt all speakers of all populations and could not become the
basis for one population losing the ability to learn the language
of another. However, this gets us back to our original question.
If this tonal restriction were indeed an example of a cultural
(speaking a tone language) pressure aﬀecting one’s genes, then
the absence of the opposite eﬀect, the principle prediction of
Chomskyan Universal Grammar – a genetic mutation that would
render one population unable to learn the grammar of another –
becomes even more mysterious.
Unfortunately, the most serious problem for UG is that
as the years have passed, it has reached the point that it is
vague and it makes no predictions about language proper –
it is disconnected from empirical content. For example in
response to a now famous paper by Evans and Levinson
(2009), “The Myth of Language Universals,” the UG community
objected to the idea that UG predicts universals in Evans
and Levinson’s “naive” sense. Critics claimed that Evans
and Levinson confused UG with Greenbergian universals (as
discussed below).
To give a closer-to-home, concrete illustration of a lack of
empirical constraints on the content of Chomskyan linguistics,
let’s look at the so-called Pirahã recursion debate. I have in
past publications (see especially Everett, 2005, Everett, 2012a,b)
criticized Noam Chomsky’s claim that all languages are built on
a recursive grammatical procedure he calls “Merge,” deﬁned as
in (1):
(1) Merge (α, β)→ {α, {α, β}}.
If α is a verb, e.g., ‘eat’ and β a noun, e.g., ‘eggs,’ then this
will produce a verb phrase (i.e., where alpha is the head of the
phrase), ‘eat eggs.’ As I said in Everett (2012b), “The operation
Merge incorporates two highly theory-internal assumptions that
have been seriously challenged in recent literature (see Everett,
accepted, in progress). The ﬁrst is that all grammatical structures
are binary branching, sinceMerge can only produce such outputs.
The second is that Merge requires that all syntactic structures be
endocentric (i.e., headed by a unit of the same category as the
containing structure, e.g., a noun heading a noun phrase a verb a
verb phrase, etc.).
My criticism is based on the fact that the Amazonian
language, Pirahã, among others (see Kornai, 2014; Jackendoﬀ and
Wittenberg, in preparation), lacks recursive structures (Everett,
2005, Everett, 2012b; Futrell et al., in preparation) – and thus,
a fortiori, Merge. My claim is that the absence of recursion is
the result of cultural values, rather than a culture-independent
grammar. One of the most common objections raised to this
criticism of Chomskyan theory is that the superﬁcial appearance
of lacking recursion in a language does not necessarily mean that
the language could not be derived from a recursive process like
Merge. There are ways to rescue the theory. And of course this is
correct.
From this latter observation, some conclude that the
(misguided in their perspective) suggestion that Piraha represents
a problem for Chomskyan theory is due to the failure
distinguish between Greenbergian vs. Chomskyan universals.
Greenbergian universals (Greenberg, 1966) have always referred
to linguistic phenomena that can actually be observed (and
thus easily falsiﬁed). These claims are tightly constrained
empirically.
On the other hand, Chomskyan universals are quite diﬀerent
because they are never directly observable. Chomsky’s concept of
universals is that they are restrictions on language development,
not necessarily observed directly in actual surface structures
of languages. Formal universals are grammatical principles or
processes or constraints common to all languages – that is,
supposedly following fromUG– at some level of abstraction from
the observable data. These abstractions can only be appreciated, it
seems, by the appropriate theoretician. Unfortunately, this makes
formal universals diﬃcult to falsify because they can always be
saved by abstract, unseen principles or entities, e.g., so-called
“empty categories.”
In this sense, the Chomskyan claim regarding recursion
(Hauser et al., 2002) would be that all languages are formed by
a recursive process, even though the superﬁcial manifestation
of that process may not look recursive to the untrained eye.
A language without Merge would lack utterances of more than
two words according to Chomsky (by this strange reasoning, all
utterances greater than three words would support Chomsky, a
rather low threshold of evidence). So long as we can say that a
sentence is the output of Merge, limited in some way, then it was
produced recursively, even though superﬁcially non-recursive.
The Greenbergian perspective, on the other hand, would be that
either you see recursion or it is not there.
Both positions are completely rational and sensible. But, as I
have said, the Chomskyan view renders the speciﬁc claim that all
languages are formed by Merge untestable. In Chomsky’s earlier
writings he claimed that if two grammars produce the same
surface strings (weak generative capacity), we could still test them
by examining the predictions of the structures they predict for
the strings (strong generative capacity). Since my work on Piraha
recursion (as well as Wari’; Everett and Kern, 1997; Everett, 2009)
has shown that the predictions Merge makes are problematic
(falsiﬁed if that were possible with such abstract universals), I
have dealt exclusively with strong generative capacity. On the
other hand, a linguist could add ancillary hypotheses to their
accounts in order to save Merge, entailing two consequences: (i)
Merge loses all predictive power and (ii) Merge provides a longer,
hence less parsimonious, account of the same structures (Everett,
2012b).
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Nativism, again, is the idea not only that we are innately
capable of language (everyone surely believes this), but that our
capabilities are speciﬁc to particular domains, e.g., grammar.
Now veterinarians who artiﬁcially inseminate animals, such as
thoroughbreds or other competitive breeds, occasionally refer to
their metal-encased syringes of semen as “man-in-a-can.” This
is a good metaphor for some theories like UG, which place the
development of human abilities in the genes rather than the
environment, i.e., those that lean strongly to the nature side of the
nature-nurture continuum, predicting that all languages emerge
from the same biological can.
Though I have argued (Everett, 2012a) that there is no
convincing evidence for UG from universals, acquisition, nor
language deﬁcits, some have countered such arguments by
claiming that “emerging” languages (creoles, Nicaraguan Sign
Language, Homesigns, and so on) manifest UG principles that
could not have been learned. Everett (2012a, 2015) argues that
they show nothing of the sort.
Stepping back a bit, it is clear that all creatures have instincts
or innate capacities. Even so, the evidence presented for such
capacities is often weak. This is particularly true for claims on
cognitive nativism. In fact, if Everett (accepted) is correct, then
higher-level cognitive capacities in Homo sapiens are the least
likely places to ﬁnd instincts. If one is claiming that a cognitive
characteristic is innate or an instinct, they must do the following
at a minimum:
(1) Show evidence for something that doesn’t seem to be
learnable.
(2) Argue convincingly that it cannot be learned from the womb
to the time of testing.
(3) Deﬁne “innate” or “instinct” so as to encompass not merely
“bias” or “capacity” but also “knowledge.”
(4) Provide a plausible account of the evolution of the trait.
(5) Keep genetics and epigenetics (constraints – embryological,
environmental – on the strength, absence, or presence of
genetic eﬀects) separate.
(6) Devise a methodology more sound than babies’ sucking
or eye-movements for investigating cognitive characteristics
(Clearﬁeld and Mix, 2001).
If you can’t meet these minimal requirements, talk of instincts,
UG, nativism, etc. is premature. Yet because almost no claim
for instincts gets beyond 1, as Blumberg (2006, p. 205) says,
such talk is “bedtime stories” for adults (see also: http://www.
pointoﬁnquiry.org/mark_blumberg_freaks_of_nature/).
What does this mean? It means that if you see claims for a
morality instinct, an art instinct, a language instinct, etc. you
are reading nothing more speculation, unless it gets signiﬁcantly
beyond level 1 above. I am not aware of any that do.
To oﬀer a more detailed example of the shortcomings of UG
proposals, let’s consider the research program developed by Iris
Berent on “the phonological mind.” My theory of “dark matter”
(Everett, accepted) implies that instincts should be minimized
in Homo sapiens. This is not because instincts are incompatible
with culture or dark matter as deﬁned in Everett (accepted).
Rather, they simply become less relevant to our understanding.
If humans learn from and participate in their surroundings and
language, then it turns out that instincts become less compelling
(Prinz, 2012, 2013). Of course, the concept of instincts is common
enough in the literature on animal behavior, in Evolutionary
Psychology, as well as in Chomskyan linguistics. At the same
time, everyone agrees general learning is responsible for at
least some of how people come to learn about the world, their
society, and themselves. My claim (Everett, accepted) is that,
given our capacity for general learning, that instincts complicate
the picture of human development, going against the inherent
cognitive and cerebral plasticity of the species. In my view,
appeal to epistemological nativism should be excised by Occam’s
Razor.
In what follows, I want to give a concrete example of
what I mean by discussing and rejecting recent work on
phonological nativism (Berent, 2013a). To anticipate somewhat,
the problems faced by all nativist proposals include the following:
(i) the non-linear relationship of genotype to phenotype; (ii)
failure to link “instincts” to environment – today’s instincts
are often tomorrow’s learning, once we learn more about the
environmental pressures to acquire certain knowledge; (iii)
problematic deﬁnitions of innateness; (iv) failure to rule out
learning before proposing an instinct; (v) the unclear content of
what is left over for instincts after acquired dark matter (all tacit
knowledge) is accounted for; (vi) lack of an evolutionary account
for the origin of the instincts.
In Berent’s (2013a) The Phonological Mind, the author argues
in detail for apparently innate preferences for some sounds
and sound sequences (and signs and sign sequences) in all
languages. I want to brieﬂy review the more detailed criticisms
of Everett (accepted) of her proposals, limited to a small portion
of her monograph.9 From the outset we should observe that the
most serious shortcomings of her notion of innate phonological
knowledge, in fact a problem for all nativist theories, is the
“origin problem.” The question needing to be answered is
“Where did the phonological knowledge come from?” Without
an account of the evolution of an instinct, proposing nativist
hypotheses is pure speculation. Rather, at best, we can take non-
evolutionary evidence for an instinct as explanada rather than
explanans. Berent’s speciﬁc proposal is that her experimental
results from English, Spanish, French, and Korean support her
proposal that there is knowledge of some type that leads to a
sonority sequencing generalization (SSG) inborn in all Homo
sapiens.
To understand her arguments, however, we must ﬁrst
understand the terms she uses, beginning with “sonority.”
Sonority is the property of one sound being inherently louder
than another sound. For example, when the vowel [a] is produced
in any language the mouth is open wider than for other vowels
and, like other vowels, [a] oﬀers very little impedance to the
ﬂow of air out of our lungs and mouths. This makes [a] the
loudest sound relatively speaking of all phonemes of English.
A sound with less inherent loudness, e.g., [k] is said to be
less sonorous. Several of Berent’s experiments demonstrate that
speakers of all the languages she tested, children and adults,
9Much of the following is taken from Everett (accepted).
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prefer words organized according to the SSG. The idea behind
the SSG is that the least loud (sonorous) segments are found at
the far edges of syllables while the loudest segments are found
closer to the nucleus of the syllable. To see what is meant more
clearly, consider a single syllable work (monosyllable) such as
“sat,” whose structure would be as shown in Figure 1.
Since [a] is the most sonorous element, it is in the nucleus
position. [s] and [t] are at the margins, onset and coda, as they
should be. Now take the hypothetical syllables, [bli] and [lbi].
Both [bli] and [lbi] have what phonologists refer to as
“complex onsets,” multiple phonemes in a single onset the same
can happen with codas as with “pant” in which [n] and [t] form
a complex coda. Now, according to the SSG, since [b] is less
sonorous than [l], it should come ﬁrst in the onset. This means
that [bli] is as a well-formed syllable should be, i.e., organized
from least sonorant/sonorous segment to most sonorous, [i], and
then, if there were a coda, to a segment less sonorous than [i]
(softer→ louder). Therefore, the correct syllabic organization is
shown in the following diagram (Figure 2).
Such preferences emerge even when the speakers’ native
languages otherwise allow grammatical strings which appear to
violate the SSG. Since the SSG is so important to the work on a
phonological instinct, we need to take a closer look at it. To make
it concrete, let’s consider one proposal regarding the so-called
sonority hierarchy (as we will see, not only do many phoneticians
consider this hierarchy to be a spurious observation, but it is
also inadequate to account for many phonotactic generalizations,
suggesting that not sonority but some other principle is behind
Berent’s experimental results).10 One form of this hierarchy comes
from Selkirk (1984; from most sonorant on left to least on
right):
10Sonority is a formal property of sounds in which it is easier to produce
“spontaneous voicing (vibration of the vocal folds while producing the sound),”
though the lay person can refer to sonority as relative loudness with little loss of
accuracy.
FIGURE 1 | Syllable structure one.
FIGURE 2 | Syllable structure two.
[a]> [e o]> [i u]> [r]> [l]> [m n N]> [z v ð]> [s f θ]> [b
d g] > [p t k].
The hierarchy has often been proposed as the basis for the
SSG, which might also be thought of as organizing syllables left
to right into a crescendo, peak, and decrescendo of sonority,
going from the least sonorant (least inherently loud) to the
most sonorant (most inherently loud) and back down, in inverse
order, to the least sonorant (in fact, I was once a proponent of
the SSG myself. See Everett (1995, for a sustained attempt to
demonstrate the eﬃcacy of this hierarchy in organizing Banawá
syllable structure).
Without reviewing all of her experimental results (which all
roughly show the same thing – preference in subjects for the SSG
in some conditions), consider the following evidence that Berent
(2013b, p. 322) brings to bear:
“... Syllables with ill-formed onsets (e.g., lba) tend to be
systematically misidentiﬁed (e.g., as leba)—the worse formed
the syllable, the more likely the misidentiﬁcation. Thus,
misidentiﬁcation is most likely in lba followed by bda, and is
least likely in bna. Crucially, the sensitivity to syllable structure
occurs even when such onsets are unattested in participants’
languages, and it is evident in adults [64,67–70,73] and young
children...”
Again, as we have seen, a licit syllable should build from least
sonorant to most sonorant and then back down to least sonorant,
across its onset, nucleus, and coda. This means that while [a] is
the ideal syllable nucleus for English, a voiceless stop like [p, t,
k] would be the least desirable (though in many languages this
hierarchy is violated regularly, e.g., Berber). Thus a syllable like
[pap] would respect the hierarchy, but there should be no syllable
like [opa] (though of course there is a perfectly ﬁne bisyllabic
German word opa “grandpa”). For the latter word, the SSGwould
only permit this to be syllabiﬁed as two syllables [o] and [pa]
with each vowel its own syllable nucleus. This is because both
[o] and [i] are more sonorous than [p] so [p] must be either
the coda or the onset of a syllable in which one of these two
vowels is the nucleus.11 Moreover, according to the SSG, a syllable
like [psap] should be favored over a syllable [spap]. This gets us
to the obvious question of why “misidentiﬁcation” by Korean
speakers is least likely in bna (even though Korean itself lacks
such sequences)? Because, according to Berent, all humans are
born with an SSG instinct.
I do not think anything of the kind follows. To show this, I
ﬁrst want to argue that there is no SSG period, not phonetically,
grammatically, or even functionally. Second, I argue that even
if we ignored the ﬁrst argument, i.e., even if some other, better
(though yet undiscovered) principle than the SSG were appealed
to, the arguments for a phonology instinct do not go through.
Third, I oﬀer detailed objections to every conclusion she draws
from her work, concluding that there is no such thing as the
“phonological mind.”
11For independent reasons – but reasons that once again show the inadequacy of
the SSG, onsets are preferred to codas, thus favoring the syllabiﬁcation of o.pa over
op.a. The reason that a simple preference such as “prefer onsets” is a problem
for the SSG is that the preference clearly shows that SSG is unable to provide an
adequate theory of syllabiﬁcation (at least on its own).
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Let’s address ﬁrst the reasons behind the claim that the SSG is
not an explanation for phonotactics. The reasons are three: (i)
there is no phonetic or functional basis for the generalization;
(ii) the SSG that Berent appeals to is too weak – it fails to
capture important, near-universal phonotactic generalizations;
(iii) the generalization is too strong – it rules out commonly
observed patterns in natural languages, e.g., English, that violate
it. But then if the SSG has no empirical basis in phonetics or
phonology and is simply a spurious observation, it is unavailable
for grammaticalization and therefore cannot serve as the basis
for the evolution of an instinct (though, of course, some other
concept or principle might be). One might reply that if the SSG is
unable to explain all phonotactic constraints, that doesn’t mean
that we should throw it out. Perhaps we can simply supplement
the SSG with other principles. But why accept a disjointed set
of “principles” to account for something that may have an easier
account based more solidly in phonetics and perception? Before
we can see this, though, let’s look at the SSG in more detail.
The ideas of sonority and sonority sequencing have been
around for centuries. Ohala (1992) claims that the ﬁrst reference
to a sonority hierarchy was in 1765. Certainly there are references
to this in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Ohala
observes, however, references to the SSG as an explanation
for syllable structure are circular, descriptively inadequate,
and not well-integrated with other phonetic and phonological
phenomena.
According to Ohala, both the SSG and the syllable itself
are theoretical constructs that lack universal acceptance. There
is certainly no complete phonetic understanding of either, a
fact that facilitates circularity in discussing them. If we take a
sequence such as alba, most phonologists would argue that the
word has two syllables, and that the syllable boundary must
fall between /l/ and /b/, because the syllable break a.lba would
produce the syllable [a], which is ﬁne, but also the syllable [lba]
which violates the SSG ([l] is more sonorous than [b] and thus
should be closer to the nucleus than [b]). On the other hand, if the
syllable boundary is al.ba, then both syllables respect the SSG, [al]
because [a] is a valid nucleus and [l] a valid coda and [ba] because
[b] is a valid onset and [a] is a valid nucleus. The fact that [l]
and [b] are in separate syllables by this analysis means that there
is no SSG violation, which there was in [a.lba]. Therefore, SSG
guides the parsing (analysis) of syllables. However, this is severely
circular if the sequences parsed by the SSG then are used again as
evidence for the SSG.
The SSG is also descriptively inadequate because it is at once
too weak and too strong. For example, most languages strongly
disprefer sequences such as /ji/, /wu/, and so on, or, as Ohala
(1992, p. 321) puts it “... oﬀglides with lowered F2 and F3 are
disfavored after consonants with lowered F2 and F3.”12,13 Ohala’s
12Formants are caused by resonance in the vocal tract. They are concentrations
of acoustic energy around a particular frequency in the speech stream. Diﬀerent
formant frequencies and amplitudes result from changing shapes of the tract. For
any given segment there will be several formants, each spaced at 1000 Hz intervals.
By resonance in the vocal tract, I mean a place in the vocal apparatus where there
is a space for vibration – the mouth, the lips, the throat, the nasal cavity, and so on.
13F2 and F3 refer to the second and third formants of the spectrographic
representation or acoustic eﬀects of producing sounds.
generalization here is vital for phonotactics crosslinguistically
and yet it falls outside the SSG, since the SSG allows all such
sequences. This means that if a single generalization or principle,
of the type Ohala explores in his article, can be found that
accounts for the SSG’s empirical range plus these other data, it
is to be preferred. Moreover, the SSG would then hardly be the
basis for an instinct and Berent’s experiments would be merely
skirting the edges of the real generalization. As we see, this is
indeed what seems to be happening in her work. The SSG simply
has no way of allowing a dw sequence, as in dwarf or tw in
twin while prohibiting bw. Yet [dw] and [tw] are much more
common than [bw], according to Ohala (though this sequence
is observed in some loanwords, e.g., bwana), facts entirely missed
by the SSG.
Unfortunately, Berent neither notices the problem that
such sequences raise for the SSG “instinct” nor does she
experimentally test the SSG based on a ﬁrm understanding
of the relevant phonetics. Rather, she assumes that since the
SSG is “grammaticalized” and now an instinct the phonetics
no longer matter. But this is entirely circular. Here, the lack of
phonetic experience and background in phonological analysis
seem to have led to hasty acceptance of the SSG, based on the
work of a few phonologists, without careful investigation of its
empirical adequacy. This is a crucial shortcoming when it comes
to imputing these behaviors to “core knowledge” (knowledge
that all humans are hypothesized to be born with). It hardly
needs mentioning, however, that a spurious observation of a few
phonlogists is not likely to serve as an instinct.
To take another obvious problem for the SSG, sequences
involving syllable-initial sibilants are common crosslinguistically,
even though they violate the SSG. Thus the SSG encounters
problems in accounting for English words like “spark,” “start,”
“skank,” etc. Since [t], [k], [p] – the voiceless stops – are not
as loud/sonorous as [s], they should come ﬁrst in the complex
onset of the syllable. According to the SSG, that is, [psark],
[tsart], should be grammatical words of English (false) while
[spark], [start], etc. should be ungrammatical – also false. Thus
the SSG is too strong (incorrectly prohibits [spark]) and too
weak (incorrectly predicts [psark]) to oﬀer an account of English
phonotactics. Joining these observations to our earlier ones, we
see that the SSG not only allows illicit sequences such as /ji/
while prohibiting perfectly ﬁne sequences such as /sp/, it simply
is not up to the task of English phonotactics more generally. And
although many phonologists have noted such exceptions, there is
not way to handle them except via ancillary hypotheses (think
“epicycles”) if the basis of one’s theory of phonotactics is the
SSG.
I conclude that Berent’s phonology instinct cannot be based on
the SSG, because the latter doesn’t exist. She might claim instead
that the instinct she is after is based on a related principle or that
the SSG was never intended to account for all of phonotactics,
only a smaller subset, and that phonotactics more broadly require
a set of principles. Or we might suggest that the principles
behind phonotactics are not phonological at all, but phonetic,
having to do with relative formant relationships, along the lines
adumbrated by Ohala. But while such alternatives might better ﬁt
the facts she is invested in, a new principle or set of principles
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cannot rescue her proposal. This is because the evidence she
provides for an instinct fails no matter what principle she might
appeal to. To see why let’s consider what Berent infelicitously
refers to (Berent, 2013b, p. 320) as “the seven wonders of
phonology.” She takes all of these as evidence for “phonological
core knowledge.” I see them all as red herrings, rather than as
evidence for a phonological mind or an instinct. These “wonders”
are:
(1) Phonology employs algebraic rules;
(2) Phonology shows universal constraints or rules, e.g., the SSG;
(3) Phonology shows shared design of all phonological systems;
(4) Phonology provides useful scaﬀolding for other human
abilities;
(5) Phonological constraints such as the SSG show early
ontogenetic onset;
(6) Phonology shows a unique design unlike other cognitive
domains;
(7) Phonology shows regenesis – phonological systems, e.g.,
sign languages, created de novo always draw on the same
principles – they never emerge ex nihilo.
These are worth exploring, however, because Berent’s work is
a model for other claims of grammatical innateness and far better
articulated than most. Therefore, let’s consider each of them in
turn.
“Algebraic rules” are nothing more than the standard rules
that linguists have used since Panini (4th century BCE). For
example, Berent uses an example of such a rule that she refers to
as the “AAB rule” in Semitic phonologies. In Semitic languages, as
is well-known, consonants and vowels mark the morphosyntactic
functions of words, using diﬀerent spacings and sequences
(internal to the word) of Cs or vs. based on conjugation or
binyanim – the order of consonants and intercalated vowels. An
example of what the variables here are illustrated below:
Modern Hebrew
CaCaC katav ‘write’
niCCaC niršam ‘register’
hiCCiC himšix ‘continue’
CiCeC limed ‘teach’
hitCaCeC hitlabeš ‘get dressed.’
In other languages such functions would most frequently be
marked by suﬃxes, inﬁxes, preﬁxes, and so on. So, clearly, taking
only this single, common example, variables are indeed found in
phonological rules.
Now, in Berent’s AAB rule (more precisely, it should be stated
as a constraint “∗AAB,” where ∗ indicates that the sequence AAB
is ungrammatical) is designed to capture the generalization that
the initial consonants of a word cannot be the same. Thus a
word like ∗sisum would be ungrammatical, because the ﬁrst two
consonants are /s/ and /s/, violating the constraint. The constraint
is algebraic because A and B are variables ranging across diﬀerent
phonological features (though A must be a consonant). But
calling this an algebraic rule and using this as evidence for an
instinct makes little sense. Such rules are regularly learned and
operate in almost every are of human cognition. For example, one
could adopt a constraint on dining seating arrangements of the
type ∗G1G1X, i.e., the ﬁrst two chairs at a dinner table cannot be
occupied by people of the same gender (G), even though between
the chairs there could be ﬂower vases, etc. Humans learn to
generalize across instances, using variables frequently. Absolutely
nothing follows from this regarding instincts.
Universality is appealed to by Berent as further evidence for a
phonology instinct. But as any linguist can aﬃrm (especially in
light of controversies over how to determine whether something
is universal or not in modern linguistic theory), there are
many deﬁnitions, uses, and abuses of the term “universality” in
linguistics. For example, some linguists, e.g., Greenberg (1966)
and Evans and Levinson (2009) argue that for something to be
meaningfully universal, it actually has to be observable in every
language. That is, a universal is a concrete entity. If it is not
found in all languages, it is not universal. That is simple enough,
but some linguists, e.g., Chomsky (1986), prefer a more abstract
conception of universal such that for something to be universal
it need only be available to human linguistic cognition. This set
of universal aﬀordances is referred to as the “toolbox.” I have
argued against this approach in many places, for being imprecise
and often circular (in particular Everett, 2012a,b). But in any
case, Berent clearly follows the notion of “universal” advocated
by Chomsky and Jackendoﬀ, inter alia. Such universals need not
be observed in all languages. Thus Berent would claim that the
SSG is universal, not because it is obeyed in all its particulars in
every language – like me, she would recognize that English allows
violations of the SSG – but because her experiments with speakers
of various languages show that they have preferences and so on
that seem to be guided by knowledge of the SSG, even when
their own native languages do not follow the SSG in particulars
or have a simple syllable structure that is by deﬁnition unable
to guide their behavior in experiments. If a Korean speaker, for
example, shows preference for or perceptual illusions with some
onset clusters and not others – in spite of the fact that there are
no such clusters in Korean (and thus s/he could not have learned
them, presumably), then this shows the universality of the SSG
(as part of the linguistic toolbox).
But there is a huge leap taken in reasoning from this type
of behavior to the presence of innate constraints on syllable
structure. For example, there are phonetic reasons why Korean
(or any) speakers prefer or more easily perceive, let us say, [bna]
sequences rather than [lba], even though neither sequence is
found in Korean. One simple explanation that comes to mind
(and highlighted by phoneticians, though overlooked by many
phonologists), is that the sequence [bna] is easier to perceive
than [lba] because the interconsonantal transition in the onset
of the former syllable produces better acoustic cues than in the
second. Berent tries to rule out this kind of interpretation by
arguing that the same restrictions show up in reading. But reading
performance is irrelevant here for a couple of reasons. First,
we know too little about the relationship between speaking and
reading cognitively to draw any ﬁrm conclusions about similarity
or dissimilarities in their performance to use as a comparison,
in spite of a growing body of research on this topic. Second, in
looking at new words speakers often try to create the phonology
in their heads and so this “silent pronunciation” could guide such
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speakers’ choices, etc. Everyone (modulo pathology) has roughly
the same ears matched to roughly the same vocal apparatus.
Thus although phonologies can grammaticalize violations of
functionally preferable phonotactic constraints, one would expect
that in experiments that clearly dissociate the experimental
data from the speaker’s own language, the functionality of the
structures, e.g., being auditorily easier to distinguish, will emerge
as decisive factors, accounting for speakers’ reactions to non-
native sequences that respect or violate sonority sequencing,
etc. In fact, there is a name for this, though with a somewhat
diﬀerent emphasis, in Optimality Theoretic Phonology (Prince
and Smolensky, 1993/2004; McCarthy and Prince, 1994) – the
“emergence of the unmarked.” So there is nothing special I can
see about the universality of these preferences. First, as we have
seen, the SSG is not the principle implicated here, because there
is no such principle. It is a spurious generalization. Second,
local phonologies may build on cultural preferences to produce
violations of preferable phonetic sequences, but the hearers are
not slaves to these preferences. Let us say that a language has a
word like “lbap.” In spite of this, the phonetic prediction would be
that in an experimental situation, the speakers would likely prefer
“blap” and reject “lbap,” since the former is easier to distinguish
clearly in a semantically or pragmatically or culturally neutral
environment. In other words, when asked to make judgments in
an experiment about abstract sequences, it is unsurprising that
the superiority of the functionality of some structures emerges
as decisive. Such motivations reﬂect the fact that the ear and
the vocal apparatus evolved together. Therefore, what Berent
takes to be a grammatical and cognitive universal is neither, but
rather a fact about perceptual ability, unrelated to a phonology
instinct.
Next, Berent talks about “shared design.” This is just the
idea that all known phonological systems derive from similar
phonological features. But this is not a “wonder” of any
sort. There is nothing inherently instinctual in building new
phonological systems from the same vocal apparatus and
auditory system, using in particular the more phonetically
grounded components of segmental sequencing.
Another purported “wonder” is what Berent refers to as
“scaﬀolding.” This is nothing more than the idea that our
phonologies are reused. They serve double duty – in grammar
and as a basis for our reading and writing (and other related
skills). This is of course false in much of some writing systems
(e.g., Epi-Olmec hieroglyphics, where speaking and writing are
based on nearly non-overlapping principles). In fact “reuse” is
expected in cognitive or biological systems to avoid unnecessary
duplication of eﬀort. It is not only a crucial feature of brain
functioning (Anderson, 2014), but it is common among humans
to reuse technology – e.g., the use of cutting instruments for
a variety of purposes, from opening cans to carving ivory.
Therefore, reuse is a common strategy of cognition, evolution,
resource management, and on and on, and is thus orthogonal to
the question of instincts.
Next, Berent talks about “regenesis,” the appearance of the
same (apparently) phonological principles in new languages, in
particular when principles of spoken phonology, e.g., the SSG
according to Berent, show up in signed systems. The claim is
that the SSG emerges when humans generate a new phonological
system de novo. But even here, assuming we can replace the
invalid SSG with a valid principle, we must use caution in
imputing “principles” to others as innate knowledge.We have just
seen, after all, how the particular phonetic preference Berent calls
the SSG could occur without instincts.
But even if we take her claims and results and face value,
“regenesis” still oﬀers no support for nativism. In spoken
languages, the notion simply obscures the larger generalization
or set of generalizations that people always prefer on the best-
sounding sequences perceptually, even when cultural eﬀects in
their native languages override these. Berent again attempts
to counter this with research on sequences of signs in signed
languages. Yet there is no sound-based principle in common
between signed and spoken languages – by deﬁnition, since one
lacks sounds altogether and the other lacks signs. Both will of
course ﬁnd it useful to organize word-internal signs or sounds
to maximize their perceptability, but no one has ever successfully
demonstrated that signed languages have “phonology” in the
same sense as spoken languages. In fact, I have long maintained
that, in spite of broadly similar organizational principles, sign
organization in visual vs. spoken languages are grounded in
entirely diﬀerent sets of features (for example, where is the
correlate of the feature “high tone” or F2 transition in signed
languages?) and thus that talking of them both as having
“phonologies” is nothing more than misleading metaphor.
Another “wonder” Berent appeals to show that phonology is
an instinct is the common poverty of the stimulus argument or
what she refers to as “early onset.” Children show the operation
of sophisticated linguistic behaviors early on, so early in fact
that a particular researcher might not be able to imagine how
it might have been learned, jumping to the conclusion that it
must not have been learned but emerges from the child’s innate
endowment. Yet all Berent shows in discussing early onset is
the completely unremarkable fact that children rapidly learn and
prefer those sound sequences that their auditory and articulatory
apparatuses have together evolved to recognize and produce most
easily. This commonality is not linguistic per se. It is physical,
like not trying to pick up a ton of bricks with only the strength
in one’s arms. Or, more appropriately, in not using sounds that
people cannot hear, e.g., with frequency that only dogs can
hear.
Finally, Berent argues for “core phonological knowledge”
based on what she terms “unique design.” This means
that phonology has its own unique properties. But this
shows nothing about innate endowment. Burrito-making
has its own unique features, as does mathematics, both
eminently learnable (like phonology). Berent’s discussion
fails to explain whey these unique features could not have
been learned, nor why the would be any evolutionary
advantage such that natural selection would favor
them.
Summing up to this point, Berent has neither established that
speakers are following sonority organization that is embedded
in their “core knowledge,” nor that her account is superior to
more intuitively plausible phonetic principles. Nor are any of her
“seven wonders of phonology” remotely wondrous.
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And yet, in spite of all of my objections up to this point, there is
a far more serious obstacle to accepting the idea of a phonological
mind, mentioned at the outset of this discussion. This is what
Blumberg (2006) refers to as the problem of “origins” which
we have mentioned and which is discussed at length in several
recent books (Blumberg, 2006; Buller, 2006; Richardson, 2007;
among others) – an obstacle Berent ignores entirely – an all too
common omission from proponents of behavioral nativism. Put
another way, how could this core knowledge have evolved? More
seriously, relative to the SSG, how could an instinct based on any
related principle have evolved? As we have seen, to answer the
origins problem, Berent would need to explain (as Tinbergen,
1963 among others, discusses at length) the survival pressures,
population pressures, environment and so on at the time of the
evolution of a valid phonotactic constraint – if the trait appears
as a mutation in one mind what leads to its genetic spread
to others in a population – what was its ﬁtness advantage? In
fact, the question doesn’t even make sense regarding the SSG,
since there is no such principle. But even if a better-justiﬁed
generalization could be found, coming upwith any plausible story
of the origin of the principle is a huge challenge, as are deﬁnitions
of innate, instinct, and the entire line of reasoning based on innate
knowledge, inborn dark matter.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued for three points: ﬁrst, UG
makes only one ironic prediction: not all people should
be able to learn all languages. Second, the most recent
incarnation of UG – recursion (Hauser et al., 2002) – is
either falsiﬁed or it has no empirical content.14 Third, I argue
that arguably the most well-developed case for grammatical
nativism, Berent (2013a), itself fails to oﬀer convincing evidence
for grammatical nativism. Because of the importance and
novelty of Berent’s arguments, I have spent the majority of the
space allotted arguing against her concept of a “phonological
mind.”
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